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COMMENTS
THE FLORIDA OIL SPILL AND POLLUTION CONTROL
ACT,* AN INTRUSION INTO THE
FEDERAL MARITIME DOMAIN
The present campaign to prevent and control water pollution
in the United States has been hampered by numerous jurisdictional conflicts between the federal and state governments. The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 1 has been the
primary federal response to the problem of water pollution. This
act stresses state involvement. ". . . State and interstate action to
abate pollution of interstate or navigable waters shall be encouraged .. "2 The act has been characterized by confusion
and inefficiency in its application, and its enforcement provisions 3 are extremely cumbersome and time consuming. In an
effort to escape this dilemma and provide more efficient pollution
control for its valuable coastal waters, Florida enacted the Oil
Spill and Pollution Control Act 4 during the 1970 legislative
session. The legislature was spurred into action following serious
oil spills in Tampa Bay and the St. John's River near Jacksonville. This act was designed mainly to control local oil pollution by
the shipping industry in waters within the territorial jurisdiction
of the state of Florida. It imposed unlimited liability without
fault upon virtually any vessel which discharged oil or any other
pollutant, while destined for or leaving any Florida port. 5 On
December 10, 1971, this act was challenged in the case of
American Waterways Operators,Inc. v. Askew in the Fifth Circuit
before a three judge federal court, after a temporary restraining
6
order had been issued.
Plaintiffs in this action were merchant shippers using Florida
ports. 7 Their initial contention, which was eventually accepted by
the court, was that the Florida Oil Spill and Pollution Control
*American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971). prob.
juris. noted, 405 U.S. 1063 (1972).
I. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 etseq. (Supp. 1972).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(b) (1971).
3. 33 U.S.C. § 1160(1971).
4. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376 (Supp.1972).
5. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12 (Supp.1972).
6. No. 71-156 (M.D. Fla. 1971),prob.juris. noted, 405 U.S. 1063 (1972).
7. See Brief for Plaintiff at 2-4, American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp.
1241 (M.D. Fla. 1971),prob.juris. noted, 405 U.S. 1063 (1972).
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Act was invalid as an attempt to legislate substantive maritime
law. According to the interpretation given Article III, section 2 of
the United States Constitution, maiitime law is a subject for
federal legislation. 8 In the absence of conflicting federal legislation, the states may act. The Florida Act was obviously maritime
legislation; and, in the words of the court, it was directly in
conflict with the Water Quality Improvement Act (WQIA), 9 a
1970 amendment to the FWPCA. Though both the WQIA and
the Florida Act subject vessels and onshore and offshore facilities
to strict liability for clean-up costs, the latter imposes a much
stricter measure of responsibility. For example, the WQIA
excuses a shipper who demonstrates that the oil spillage was the
result of an act of God, an act of war, or the act or omission of a
third party. 10 The Florida Act allows these defenses to only a
limited degree. The Florida Act sets no limit to the amount of
recovery," while the WQIA does. 12 In addition, the WQIA
creates a duty solely for clean-up costs and leaves undisturbed
the remedies in tort available under maritime law for private
injury. However, the Florida Act creates strict liability for both
damages resulting from
the costs of governmental clean-up and 13
injury to the state or private land owners.
According to District Judge Tjoflat:
[T]he Florida Act, if valid, would materially change. the substantive
maritime law governing the disposition of claims arising from the
pollution of coastal waters.
It is well settled that state legislation is invalid where it is in
rules or congressional enactcontradiction with general admiralty
14
ments in the maritime field.

He rejected defendant's contentions that the state legislature had
sought to act in an area of purely local concern, and the
traditional view that state legislation may fill voids in maritime
law by providing a remedy where the federal law provides
none. 15
Thus, it appears that the holding of this case is that where state
8. U.S. Const. art. Il1, § 2.
9. 33U.S.C.§ 1161 elseq.(1971).
10. 33U.S.C.§ 1161(f)(1971).
1I. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12 (Supp. 1972).
12. 33U.S.C.§ 1161(f) (1971).
13. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.12 (Supp. 1972).
14. American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1248 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
15. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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legislation contradicts federal law of maritime tort claims, it is
invalid.
This holding appears simple, direct and in accordance with
precedent. However, there are some subtle distinctions that have
emerged throughout the development of maritime law which
Judge Tjoflat declined to give consideration. If this holding is
affirmed on appeal, it will greatly reduce the power of the states
to control pollution within their boundaries.
The grant of jurisdiction to federal courts to administer
maritime law derives from constitutional language extending the
"judicial Power of the United States" to "all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction. ' ' 16 This constitutional provision and
the grant of "cognizance" by the Judiciary Act of 178917 have, by
interpretation and inference, been made the basis of extensive
federal power. This power extends not only to jurisdiction over
maritime cases, but also to passage of substantive law regarding
maritime matters.' 8 Basically, the admiralty jurisdiction of the
United States extends to all waters, salt or fresh, with or without
tides, natural or artificial, which are in fact navigable in interstate
or foreign commerce. This is the case whether or not the
particular body of water is wholly within one state, and whether
or not the occurrence or transaction that is the subject matter of
the suit is confined to one state. 19
Maritime torts, those occurring on admiralty waters, are
subject to admiralty jurisdiction.20 Admiralty tort jurisdiction has
traditionally depended upon the locality where the tort occurred,
2
not upon the nature of the tort or the parties involved. '
However, in 1948 the Extension of Admiralty Act was passed. In
part, it read:
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States shall
extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to persons or
property, caused by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding
22
that such damage or injury be done or consumated on land.

23
This law was explicitly followed in Interlake S.S. Co. v. Nielsen,
§2.
16. U.S. Const. art. II1,
17. 1Stat. 76-77 (1789). The provision has been carried over in somewhat altered language into
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1971).
18. G. Gilmore and C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 18 (1957).
19. Id. at 28-29.
20. Davis v. Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla. 1965); United States v. Ross, 74
F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Mo. 1947).
21. Atlantic Transport Co. ofW. Va. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
22. 46 U.S.C. § 740(1971).
23. 338 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1964).
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and in Gebhardv. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator24 where the court said
the Admiralty Extension Act extended jurisdiction to shoreside
damage or injury to person or property caused by a vessel and
imposed no other requirements.
The crucial problem is to determine when state law can intrude
upon the federal admiralty jurisdiction. One of the most influential pronouncements concerning the power of a state to legislate
25
maritime law was made in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.
According to Mr. Justice McReynolds:
No [state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose
expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the
characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes
of that law in its
with the proper harmony and uniformity
26
international and interstate relations.

This limitation was extended, as pointed out by Judge Tjoflat, in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,27 to prohibit Congress from
allowing state legislation in areas considered to be under the
jurisdiction of federal maritime law.
It is apparent that situations might arise where the maritime
law would not have a rule regarding some particular situation
which generally would be within the federal admiralty jurisdiction. The problem then becomes one of whether the federal court
should proceed to fashion its own rule as part of the general
maritime law, which would subsequently be applied uniformly to
all similar cases within that court's jurisdiction; or whether it
would yield to state law to provide the rule of decision. If the
latter procedure is followed, the matter would be subject to
variation among the states. 2 8 Generally, the courts have upheld
state legislation which supplements federal law. Some courts, in
order to allow state laws in admiralty jurisdiction, have relied on
the "gap" theory: If the maritime law provides no rule of
decision, the states may provide one. 29 The theory has generally
been denounced as artificial, often resulting in conflicting conclusions. 30
24. 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1970).
25. 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
26. Id. at 216.
27. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
28. Sovel, Determining the Applicable Law in Cases Arising in State Territorial Waters, 37
Temp. L.Q. 479, 482 (1964).
29. Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 240(1921); and The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199,
213(1886).
30. Currie, Federalism and Admiralty, Sup. Ct. Rev. 158, 167 (1960).
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Another justification for allowing state legislation in the realm
of maritime law, and thus an exception to the uniformity
principle, is a strong, local public interest. 31 Problems have arisen
from a conflict of state and federal interests and have been
resolved by comparing their relative strengths. State laws have
been declared valid when they preserve public order, 32 compensate for the use of public property, 33 or promote health or
safety. 34 The case in question includes all of these criteria.
From 1940 until approximately 1960 in maritime tort cases
mainly involving wrongful death and insurance, the Supreme
Court followed the curious policy of accepting state law
whenever it inured to the injured plaintiff's benefit and rejected it
whenever the law was detrimental. 35 In Hess v. United States,36
the Court permitted unprecedented lack of uniformity in order to
allow recovery under state law, and in Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique,37 the Court manufactured its own rule
imposing liability where the state law would have blocked relief.
Fortunately, this irrational approach to determining the validity
of state legislation was completely abandoned once the Jones Act
operated to provide a remedy for injured plaintiffs. 38
The most recent cases emphatically state that in situations
involving specifically maritime torts, rights of the parties must be
determined by general maritime principles and not state law.
These cases merely reiterate the principle established by the
Admiralty Extension Act. As interpreted in Holland v. Steag,
Inc.,39 state law was inapplicable to maritime torts when it
conflicted with the general policy of maritime law, or when acts
of Congress had superseded the state laws. This decision was
reaffirmed in Massaro v. United States Lines Co.,40 and in
Wharton v. T. A. Loving and Co.41 In addition, according to
Petition of New Jersey Barging Corp.,42 vessel oil pollution of

navigable waters resulting in damage to shoreline property has
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Law of Admiralty, supra note 18, at 45.
Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559(1881).
Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691 (1882).
Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937).
Currie, supra note 30, at 218.
361 U.S.314(1960).

37. 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
38. 46 U.S.C. §688(1971).

39.
40.
41.
42.

143 F. Supp.
307 F.2d 299
344 F.2d 739
168 F. Supp.

203 (D. Mass. 1956).
(3rd Cir. 1962).
(4th Cir. 1965).
925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

been held to be a maritime tort, within admiralty jurisdiction.
These decisions appear to have somewhat settled the problem of
when to allow state legislation in the particular area of maritime
torts. They seem to close all channels by which the Florida Oil
Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act could be considered
constitutional in the face of the pre-existing WQIA. Unless these
precedents are ignored or overruled, Judge Tjoflat's holding
appears correct.
The holding in American Waterways Operators,Inc. v. Askew
has some significant ramifications for the state of Florida.
Although the WQIA provides for immediate notification of oil
spills 43 and authorizes a $35 million revolving fund for emergency oil clean-ups, 44 it has certain rather weak provisions which
the Florida Act attempted to supplement. According to the
WQIA the owner or operator of a vessel or an onshore or
offshore facility is subject to limited liability "without fault" for
the costs expended by the government in cleaning up an oil
spill. 45 Unfortunately, this is not as strict a provision as it may
appear. The amount of liability of a vessel is limited to $100 per
gross ton or $14 million, whichever is less. The liability of an
onshore or offshore facility is limited to just $8 million. 46 Only
where the spillage results from willful negligence or willful
misconduct is liability unlimited. 47 This limitation appears to be
an imminently short-sighted provision. Recent developments
have shown that giant oil tankers are no longer a thing of the
future but a reality. It becomes imperative that no overall ceiling
on liability be adopted. Otherwise, an immense tanker could
escape liability for much of its damage. 48 If applied to the Torrey
Canyon disaster of March 19, 1967, the WQIA would have
created a liability of only $6 million ($100 x 60,000 gross tons),
while the actual clean-up costs were approximated at $20
million. 49
[Ilt is a fact that if adequate protection is not legislated now when
the giant tankers are just beginning to make their appearances, it
43. 33 U.S.C. § 1161(b)(4)(1971).
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
Wash.
49.
Wash.

33U.S.C.§ 1161 (k)(1971).
33U.S.C.§ 1161(0(1971).
Id.
Id.
Mendelsohn, Maritime Liabilityfor Oil Pollution-Domestic and International Law, 38 Geo.
L. Rev. 1, 26(1969).
The Control of Pollution by Oil Under the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 27
& Lee L. Rev. 278, 297-298 (1970).
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will be infinitely more difficult to so legislate once these tankers are
common and industry has grown accustomed to
the cost savings
50
they realize with low levels and terms of liability.

Both the 1970 Federal Act and the Florida Act require ship
owners of potentially polluting vessels to show proof of financial
responsibility before they are authorized to operate. The Florida
51
Act is broader. It covers all vessels of any size, including barges.
The WQIA applies only to vessels which are over 300 gross
tons. 52 In addition, the Federal Act requires proof of financial
responsibility only in regard to liability to the United States. This
means the insurers are not liable to any plaintiff but the federal
government.5 3 According to the standards set by Florida's
Department of Natural Resources in January of 1971, adopted
pursuant to the Florida Act, 54 owners must prove financial
responsibility up to $200 per gross ton or to $19 million
whichever is the lesser amount. The Florida Act also requires
proof of financial responsibility to cover the damages suffered by
55
any and all claimants.
The WQIA would excuse shippers and owners of onshore and
offshore facilities who prove by a preponderance of evidence that
spillage was caused by an act of God, an act of war, negligence
on the part of the United States Government, or the act or
omission of a third party.5 6 These four exceptions provide quite a
loophole for offenders. The Federal Act opens the door to
litigation and the chance that the offender may escape total
liability for oil spillage. The Florida Act contains only a provision
for discretionary "executive clemency, ' 57 which is much more
restrictive. It leaves the offender with little chance of formulating
a valid defense.
The WQIA forces state, municipal or private land owners to
rely on remedies available under traditional maritime law.
Recovery of damages in such a case is dependent upon proof of
negligence or unseaworthiness. If fault is established, a vessel
owner's financial responsibility for property damages is limited to
the value of the vessel at the end of the voyage, plus the "freight
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Mendelsohn, supra note 48, at 27.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.14 (Supp. 1972).
33U.S.C.§ 1 16 1(p)(1)( 197 1).
Id.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.14(l) (Supp. 1972).
Id. at(I)(b).
33 U.S.C. § 1161(f)(1970).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 376.1 l(6)(b) (Supp. 1972).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

then pending," unless the damage was caused with the owner's
knowledge .58
To effectively adjudicate valid claims against polluting vessels
and their owners, plaintiffs must rely on admiralty law jurisdictional provisions. These provisions allow claimants to obtain
either in personamjurisdiction over the vessel's owner 59 or in rem
jurisdiction over the vessel itself anywhere within the jurisdiction
of a federal district court. 60 If in personam jurisdiction has been
obtained, the vessel's owner may be held personally liable subject
to his right of liability limitation. By means of an in rem action,
plaintiff may have the polluting vessel arrested, bonded and sold
61
in order to satisfy a successful claim.
Fortunately, the courts have become increasingly aware of the
problem of oil pollution of the marine environment. Consequently, the general maritime law is being interpreted more
liberally to provide adequate remedies for broad classes of
injured plaintiffs. 62 Still, plaintiffs are faced with the duty of
proving negligence. This can be extremely difficult, and under
such circumstances the average coastal shore owner would
probably prefer to accept a significantly smaller settlement rather
than face the prospect of protracted litigation and the risk that he
may recover nothing at all.
Under these conditions, it would seem much more logical to
extend strict liability beyond the federal government clean-up
costs to include damage to the state and private land owners. If
strict liability is appropriate in any transportation context, it is
certainly appropriate here. The vessel owner and the oil industry
are in a far superior position to bear and distribute the risk than
the coastal shore owner whose property is inundated by oil.63
The force of Judge Tjoflat's ruling will not be limited to
Florida. It appears that Maine's Oil Handling Law 64 may face a
similar fate. This legislation was passed in February, 1970,
because of the proposed offshore Machiasport oil refinery.
Subsequently, this legislation has been challenged in the Superior
58. Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183 etseq. (1971).
59. Plaintiff who has an in personam claim may also bring suit in the "common law" court. See
the "Saving Clause." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1971).
60. Comment, Admiralty Remedies for Vessel Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, 7 Tex. Int'l L.
J. 121, 150(1971).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., supra note 48, at 25.
64. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, §541-57 (Supp. 1972).
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Court of Kennebec County, Maine by Amoco, Chevron, Citgo,
Getty, Gulf, Humble, Mobil, Shell, Sunoco, and Texaco, and
separately by the Portland Pipeland Corporation. Prior to this
act, Maine state law included only one prohibitory sentence
against oil pollution, with no provisions for damages, enforcement, or insurance. 65
According to the 1970 act, oil tankers are taxed on the basis of
one-half cent per barrel of oil or petroleum products. 66 The
resulting revenue constitutes the Maine Coastal Protection Fund
with a maximum of $4 million. The proceeds of the fund are to
be used for a variety of oil spill prevention and control activities,
or for payment of damage claims on an arbitration basis to both
state and individual claimants. 67 If recovery against the tanker,
its owner, its charterer, or its operator are for some reason
impossible, the state may proceed against the terminal operator
of the facility to which the tanker was bound. This measure
overcomes the possible inability of the state to reach a tanker
which has polluted and escaped the jurisdiction. In effect, it
compels terminal operators to obtain indemnification from
carriers, thereby permitting the state to benefit from the "personal contract" exemption of the Limitation of Liability Act. 68
As in the Florida Act, the Maine Act requires no proof of
negligence:
In any suit to enforce claims of the State under this section, it shall
not be necessary for the State to plead or prove negligence . ..
the State need only plead and prove the fact of the prohibited
discharge .. .and that it occurred at facilities under the control
of the licensee .... 69

These provisions would apparently fall within the prohibition
established in the American Waterways Operators case. This act,
or at least parts of it, will probably be declared an unconstitutional intrusion into federal maritime law.
The Miller Anti-Pollution Act 70 passed in 1971 in California is
another example of attempted state legislation in the area of oil
pollution control. This act, though rather vague, imposes absolute
liability for oil pollution upon "any owner or operator of any
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Bradford, Maine's Oil Spill Legislation, 7 Tex. Int'l L. J. 29,30 (1971).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 551(4a) (Supp. 1972).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 551(2), (3) (Supp. 1972).
Bradford, supra note 65, at 32. See Law of Admiralty, supra note 18, at 26-28.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 552(2) (Supp. 1972).
Miller Anti-Pollution Act, Cal. Harb. and Nay. Code, § 293 (West Supp. 1972).
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vessel engaged in the commercial transportation of petroleum or
fuel oil" where there is no unforeseeable intervening cause.71
Liability includes damages incurred by the state or any county,
city, district, or person within the state and for any damage to the
natural resources of the state caused by the discharge or leakage
of petroleum or fuel oil from vessels into or upon the navigable
waters of the state. These provisions for the disposition of tort
claims extend beyond the WQIA, thus placing the act in peril of
being declared unconstitutional. However, the act has yet to be
challenged.
If the precedent established by Judge Tjoflat is affirmed,
individual states may have an extremely difficult task in providing more stringent measures for coastal pollution prevention and
clean-up than the WQIA provides. The most effective means for
establishing control, absolute liability and harsh penalties, have
been effectively declared off-limits. Thus, states whose livelihood
is largely dependent on unpolluted coastal areas, such as Florida,
Maine and California, are completely dependent on federal
legislation which is pock-marked by loopholes, insufficient remedies, and inefficient procedures.
Judge Tjoflat's holding would not necessarily be limited in its
application. Since it concerned maritime torts, the holding could
easily be extended to all navigable waters. According to The
Daniel Ball:
Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law
which are navigable in fact. And they are navigable in fact when
they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary
condition, as highways for commerce. . . .And they constitute
navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the
acts of Congress . ..when they form in their ordinary condition
by themselves or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on with other states or
foreign countries .... 27

Thus, the rule of the American Waterways Operators case could
apply to all waters under federal admiralty jurisdiction, lakes,
rivers, and streams in addition to coastal waters. This would
seemingly be in direct contradiction to a basic policy of the
FWPCA-to recognize, preserve and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the states in preventing and controlling
71. Id.
72. 77 U.S. 557, 563(1870).
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water pollution. By 1948, every state had assumed responsibility
for water pollution and most states had placed the administration
of the program in the state health department.7 3 Until the
passage of the 1956 Water Pollution Control Act, almost all of the
water pollution control work remained at the state level. 74 In
1965, the Federal Water Quality Act 75 placed responsibility on
each of the fifty states for formulating water quality standards for
interstate waters and for drawing-up a comprehensive plan
indicating how these standards were to be met. Presently, the
standards cover most of the major rivers and streams in the
country. 76 It seems that the state power to formulate standards of
pollution and to decide how these standards are to be met could
very likely fall within the scope of Judge Tjoflat's ruling in regard
to maritime torts. The grant of state power by the FWPCA seems
even more likely to conflict with the Knickerbocker ruling,
reiterated by Judge Tjoflat, which holds that Congress does not
have the authority to grant to the states power to legislate within
the federal maritime field. In any case, it appears that the holding
of Judge Tjoflat may have some far-reaching effects in the area of
water pollution.
On a more fundamental level of federal versus state power, the
placing of control over coastal water pollution in the hands of the
federal government has some definite advantages. Theoretically,
each individual state could draft legislation which would treat its
own particular water pollution problems most effectively. But the
ability to enforce pollution standards is another matter. It is
generally agreed that the states have performed inadequately in
controlling water pollution. The federal government is initially
superior to the states, in that it possesses more resources in terms
of money, knowledge, and effective power.77 Only the federal
government has the scientific and technical personnel needed to
develop the body of knowledge necessary to set water quality
standards. It is also more likely to have the personnel needed to
put the pollution progams into operation and enforce the
standards. Federal control is also superior because it is not
subject to jurisdictional limits. In addition, Washington has
generally proven less vulnerable to the pressures and lobbying of
73.
74.
75.
76.
77,

J. Davies, Politics Of Pollution 109 (1970).
Id.
33 U.S.C.§§l152 and 1156 (1965).
J. Brecher, Environmental Law Handbook 221 (1971).
Politics Of Pollution, supra note 73, at 203. A. Reitze, Environmental Law 1-57 (1972).
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industrial polluters or other economic blocs. 78 Such industries are
of more immediate importance to the economy of the state
and thus possess a great deal of bargaining power at that level.7 9
The state governments are generally less sophisticated and have
fewer political resources to draw on than does the federal
government.80 Thus, from a structural standpoint, the federal
government would appear to be the logical choice for the locus
for control of water pollution. For these reasons, the ruling in the
American Waterways Operators case could be beneficial to
pollution control efforts. However, in actual practice, the federal
effort has been characterized by inefficiency and procrastination
as exemplified by the FWPCA. Therefore, states such as Florida
and possibly Maine and California may be forced to suffer, in
spite of their own efforts, until federal control is perfected. More
stringent measures, as set forth in the Florida Act, would greatly
enhance the effort to control the coastal oil pollution which so
greatly threatens the Atlantic and Pacific Coastal United States.
NICHOLAS R. GENTRY

78. Politics Of Pollution, supra note 73, at 203. Environmental Law, supra note 77.
79. Environmental Law Handbook, supra note 76, at 24.
80. Politics Of Pollution, supra note 73, at 96.

